The belief theory of prejudice suggests that prejudice results from an aversion toward individuals who hold beliefs which are incongruent with one's own. It was postulated that the aversion toward incompatible beliefs was due to universal needs for consensual validation (Rokeach, Smith, & Evans, 1960) and/or the desire for the reinforcement provided by belief agreement (Byrne & Wong, 1962) . Furthermore, belief theory proponents have suggested that without anticipations about belief differences, no prejudice would exist. Rokeach et al. (1960) , in elaborating that point in the original formal presentation of the belief theory, asked and answered the ultimate question:
Are there two qualitatively different kinds of prejudice, or can racial and ethnic prejudice be subsumed under belief prejudice? The data, such as they are, seem to yield up a primarily no answer to the fi rst part, and primarily yes answer to the second part of the question [p. 157] .
Since that statement, a good many other researchers have interpreted their research as supporting those notions.
The purposes of this paper are several: First, to demonstrate that the question of race versus belief cannot be answered in the abstract, and that any attempt at a quantitative answer to the question of the relative strength of race and belief differences in determining prejudice is inappropriate. In order to develop the argument leading to that conclusion, a review of the literature supporting the belief theory will be presented, discussed, and criticized. The second purpose of this paper is to show that the interaction of belief differences and race are quite complex and that a reformulation of the belief theory in terms of mutual causal relations between racial prejudice and beliefs (rather than the unidirectional relation presently in vogue) is Published in Psychological Review, Vol. 79, No. 2 (1972) 
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The belief theory of prejudice introduced by M. Rokeach stated that racial prejudice is the result of the anticipation of belief differences. The unidirectional causal relationship implied is criticized as oversimplifi ed. Research, supporting the belief theory is examined, with conceptual and experimental defi ciencies noted. A new formulation is proposed which emphasizes mutual causality between racial prejudice and anticipated belief differences. Two studies supporting that view are presented in which belief communications were presented as tape-recorded interviews or speeches, with the race and social class of the communicator fi rst having been manipulated. The interrelationships between communicator's race, specifi c communication topic, and subject's prejudice level on the dimensions of felt similarity of the subject to the communicator are seen as supporting the mutual causation formulation.
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BELIEF THEORY RESEARCH
In the initial belief theory research of Rokeach et al. (1960) , stimulus individuals were presented in a factorial design of Race × Belief, so that the stimulus persons were presented as (a) Negro person who agrees; (b) Negro person who disagrees; (c) white person who agrees; (d) white person who disagrees. Agreement was manipulated by the stimulus person's stand on some one topic, so that most stimulus person presentations were as short as " A Negro who believes in God." Topics were both general and race relevant, including socialized medicine, communism, labor unions, God, immediate desegregation, fraternity and sorority integration, equality of race, and integration of neighborhoods. Prejudice was determined on the basis of the subject's responses to a 9-point social-distance-type scale concerning potential friendship. Using a factorial design of Race × Agreement (Belief), the data indicated that the basic hypothesis concerning the greater power of the belief manipulation was correct.
Almost identical stimulus person presentation methods were used by Smith, Williams, and Willis (1967) with subject populations different in location and age from those of the Rokeach research. Their fi ndings generally tended to replicate the Rokeach fi ndings, although a high degree of racial (as opposed to belief) discrimination was found for the Louisiana subject sample. There were, however, several signifi cant problems with the research. The questionnaire was undisguised so that it was completely obvious to subjects that race and belief issues were being studied and that their responses would indicate both their attitudes toward the belief issues and toward race. Results must be interpreted, therefore, with the recognition of the confounding of social desirability with racial prejudice mediated by the obvious demand characteristics of the situation. Second, in this rather artifi cial, situation, subjects must make some decisions as to what the experimenter means to imply by his stimulus materials. Does the mention of one man as Negro and another as white imply that all other things are equal between the two ? Although a subject could blithely develop and accept such a premise in the context of psychological research, he might never be willing to concede the same point in real-life racial interactions. This objection also concerns the question of whether the laboratory presentation of race-relevant materials results in subjects believing the experimenter. Suspiciousness checks have been conspicuously absent from the bulk of the cited research. One does not read any reports of such direct questions as "Did you think we were looking at the infl uence of race on your responses ?" A rare reported occurrence of a check of any sort (Hendrick, Bixenstine, & Hawkins, 1971) asked subjects "to describe their reactions to the experiment." Work on postexperimental questionnaire procedures for deception experiments has suggested the advantages of direct and specifi c questions following more general ones as an ideal technique for detecting true suspicions: without eliciting false-positive reports (Page, 1971 ). Whether we consider the possibility of mistaken assumptions on the part of the subjects, or their possible suspiciousness of the experimenter's true intent, there is cause for serious doubt that subjects respond to the stimulus materials in a manner which is similar to their real-life behavior.
A second category of objection to the Rokeach et al. (1960) and Smith et al. (1967) studies was explicated by the research of Triandis and Davis (1965) . Using stimulus person presentation techniques similar to the Rokeach et al. (1960) method, those authors presented to each of 300 subjects eight stimulus persons representing all combinations of race (white or Negro), sex, and strong pro or anti views toward civil rights. Stimulus persons were described in short phrases such as "Male, Negro, favors strong civil rights legislation." Dependent measures of semantic differential and so-cial-distance-like behavioral differential scales were used. From previously determined factor structures (Triandis, 1964) , the behavioral differential scales were classifi ed into the fi ve factors of formal social acceptance, friendship acceptance, marital acceptance, social distance, and subordination. For the fi rst two factors, belief differences provided the greatest infl uence, while sex and race had the most impact on the third, and the last two were most infl uenced by race. These results were interpreted as suggesting that the dependent measures used determine the relative infl uence of the race versus belief infl uence. Other research (Dienstbier, 1970) extended those fi ndings. For the same subjects, while favoritism may be indicated toward minority group members (over whites) on one scale such as "would elect to political offi ce," signifi cant negative prejudice may still be indicated on other more race-sensitive scales such as "accept as kin by marriage." Mezei (1971) has since suggested that the greater infl uence of race on such items as marriage acceptance is merely due to subjects' anticipation of social disapproval for a more lenient stand. The Mezei data are, unfortunately, not free from the alternative interpretation that race prejudice is very real, and that subjects see other people as sharing their prejudice in order to defend their own views and because (as the belief theory suggests) they want to believe that others largely share their beliefs and values. At present, then, it appears that certain dependent measures are far more responsive to racial prejudice while others are more belief sensitive. The friendship acceptance scales of the Rokeach et al. (1960) and the Smith et al. (1967) research and the choice of work partner scales used in Byrne's research (reviewed below) are far more susceptible to belief than race infl uences (Dienstbier, 1970; Triandis, 1961; Triandis & Davis, 1965) . Their use, therefore, biases results toward confi rmation of the belief theory.
Using a different stimulus person presentation technique, Byrne and Wong (1962) presented stimulus persons through a 26-item checklist of attitudes, with the valence of the attitudes of the stimulus persons having been derived from previously acquired self-reports of the subjects on those same attitudes. The stimulus persons' attitude checklists were constructed so that attitudes were like those of the individual subject (all responses to each item on the same side of the 6-point scale, but not necessarily in the same exact scale position as chosen by the subject), or unlike those of the subject. The checklist "of attitudes developed by Byrne concerned such topics as marriage, entertainment, religion, politics, drinking, and a Catholic president; the items do not, according to Byrne and Wong, "refl ect common elements in the Negro stereotype." Analysis of the factorial design of two levels of subject prejudice by two levels of race (Negro and white) by two levels of agreement (belief) found agreement to be the greatest source of variance on the dependent measures-choice of work partner and personal feeling scales.
In subsequent related research by Byrne and McGraw (1964) , Stein, Hardyck, and Smith (1965) , Stein (1966) , Insko and Robinson (1967) , and Robinson and Insko (1969) , the attitude checklist belief manipulation method was elaborated and applied to different subject populations, in some cases with the addition of such factors as age and, religious differences attributed to the stimulus individuals. The Byrne and McGraw (1964) research used the same checklist of attitude manipulations of belief as the previous Byrne research. Stein et al. (1965) and Stein (1966) used a teenager questionnaire of about 2-5 items, a few of which were relevant to stereotypes of blacks (concerning intelligence, morality, ambition, and dancing ability). Insko and Robinson (1967) and Robinson and Insko (1969) used many of the same belief manipulation items of Stein's research, adding several items taken from the Blake and Dennis (1943) study on Negro stereotypes. Robinson and Insko (1969) provided a clever refi nement on the practice of making the dissimilar checklist by fi lling out the stimulus person's checklist with items scored opposite from the subject's. Their method involved fi nding what the sub-ject's estimates of the typical black's attitudes, and returning that profi le back to the subject later, attributed once to a white and once to a black individual. Although these studies generally attempted to disguise the true nature of the research by suggesting to the subjects that the stimulus individuals were real people, the attitude checklist technique still suffers under the obvious limitation of being quite artifi cial, so that applicability of results to behavior in nonlaboratory situations is quite limited.
These studies conceptualized and operationalized prejudice in a variety of ways. Although Byrne and McGraw (1964) used only the choice of friendship and work partner measures of the previous Byrne research, the research of Stein (1966) and Stein et al. (1965) used social-distance-type measures which ranged into such race-sensitive areas as acceptance as kin by marriage. The dependent measures of Insko and Robinson (1967) and Robinson and Insko (1969) included both semantic differential and social-distance-type items.
Generally the Byrne and McGraw (1964) research supported the belief theory predictions, as did the Stein et al. (1965) and Stein (1966) research (on all prejudice measures except that of "accept as kin by marriage" used in the Stein et al., 1965, research) . The southern samples of the Insko and Robinson (1967) and the Robinson and Insko (1969) studies, however , indicated a greater degree of race than belief prejudice on most of the social-distance-type measures which were based on Triandis' behavioral differential factors of friendship acceptance and social distance. Semantic differential scales generally indicated greater belief than race effects (Insko & Robinson, 1967; Robinson & Insko, 1969) .
Other experiments, which were designed to test the belief theory but which used stimulus person presentation techniques different from those described above, did not provide uniform support for the belief theory. Triandis (1961) presented stimulus individuals by religious, occupational, and racial labels, asking each subject to imagine the stimulus individual to be of the same or different philosophy as the subject. Results did not support the belief theory, instead they indicated race to be the most important variable in determining prejudice on a variety of social distance scales (in contrast to similarity of philosophy, religion, and occupation). In three separate experiments, Rokeach and Mezei (1966) had subjects interact with four confederates, two of whom (one white and one Negro) agreed with the subject and two of whom disagreed (on topics not directly relevant to race or race-stereotype issues). Using the subject's choice of two coffee partners or two work partners as a measure of attraction toward the confederates, the experimenters were able to determine that more choices were made on the basis of ) belief alone than of race alone. Frequent choices of partners in combinations which could not be attributed to race or belief similarity, however, limit the degree to which those results can be interpreted as supportive of the belief theory. In a study similar in conception to that of Rokeach and Mezei (1966) , Hendrick et al. (1971) presented subjects with a videotape sequence of two whites and two blacks discussing the issue of the Vietnam war. Using measures of felt similarity, liking, and trait ratings as prejudice indexes, the authors found that the actors' race had much weaker effects than their position on the war issue, concluding: "The results of the study provide substantial support for the Rokeach et al. theory [p. 255] ." "In fact, race may not be a very important variable at all [italics added, p. 257]" in determining attraction. The authors note, however, that those conclusions do not extend to such measures as the "date my sister" social distance item used in their research (which showed large race effects).
Although the Rokeach and Mezei (1966) and Hendrick et al. (1971) studies used mote lifelike presentations of the stimulus individuals and their communications than did the other reviewed studies, Rokeach and Mezei (1966) used dependent measures which are more sensitive to belief manipulations, as described above, and both studies used communications devoid of race-relevant content. With respect to this last issue, there is little value in manipulating belief issues which have nothing to do with racial stereotypes and prejudice. If white Americans feel antipathy toward black Americans based on assumptions about the blacks' beliefs, those beliefs will not as likely be beliefs about the Vietnam war as about ambition, morality, cleanliness, dependability, etc. The race prejudice reduction achieved in the several studies which have used belief issues irrelevant to racial prejudice and stereotypes have probably achieved that reduction partly because student subjects are generally somewhat reluctant to make responses which appear prejudiced, partly because their initial level of race prejudice might be very low, and partly because they may make unwarranted assumptions about the stimuli toward which they should respond.
The differences in fi ndings between researchers using different techniques to manipulate independent variables naturally provide the stuff of controversy. Logically, there appear to be an unlimited number of ways in which either race or belief information could be manipulated, making dubious the conclusions of studies which purport to show that one class of variables is more powerful than the other. Some researchers in the area have been aware of this problem, though such awareness has not always been apparent in titles which have ranged from "Two kinds of prejudice or one?" (Rokeach et al., 1960) , and "Race and belief: An open and shut case" (Stein et al., 1965) , to "Race versus belief similarity as determinants of attraction : A search for a fair test" (Hendrick et al., 1971) . Responding to the logical demands of the situation, Byrne (see Byrne & Irwin, 1969) , who had himself once been in the thick of the controversy, concluded that the question of relative strength could not be meaningfully answered. As indicated in the review above, however, the debate was subsequently taken up by Hendrick et al. (1971) , who concluded that fi nally they had the "fair test," so that "while assessment of relative power is diffi cult, the question is certainly not meaningless." This test was achieved through "approximately equating . . . intuitively" the relative strength of the two independent variables.
ALTERNATE FORMULATIONS TO THE BELIEF THEORY
Although the logical problem of the relative strength of factorially presented race and belief manipulations is serious, other aspects of the belief theory and its Supporting research are also weak. The explication of these problems will be aided by the consideration of a more complex view of prejudice presented by Allport (1954) six years before the advent of the belief theory. Allport defi ned prejudice as "an antipathy based upon a faulty and infl exible generalization." Within the defi nition itself, there is no clue as to the origins of that antipathy, but Allport suggested that the bases are legion, including fear of strangeness, felt needs to justify discriminatory or economic practices, various ego-defense needs often associated with guilt, and ego-defense functions of projection and displacement. Often too, prejudice was conceived by Allport to result from the child simply imitating the antipathies of the parents. It is apparent that Allport's understanding of prejudice is not completely harmonious with belief theory notions. Whereas Allport suggested that the negative beliefs about an ethnic group might result from negative feelings which themselves may exist for any number of reasons, Rokeach et al. (1960) suggest rather unequivocally that the causal sequence is the opposite-prejudice results from perceived belief differences. Thus, while the fi rst view sees prejudice as having complex causal roots, with feelings and beliefs being complexly related in mutually supportive relationships, the belief view attempts to explain prejudice on a far simpler basis and implies a simpler view of man.
The unidirectional belief theory view of "prejudice from anticipated belief differences" implies that information presented to cor-rect belief misconceptions should result in prejudice being monotonically reduced. But social observation suggests that this may not occur. There are numerous examples of minority populations existing for years within majority cultures with no changes in the majority's often inaccurate stereotypes. One example of this phenomenon is the persistence of the myth of Negro male sexual prowess so popular in the South (Dollard, 1937) . It seems, then, that 'some erroneous beliefs that are the cause of racial prejudice (to follow the causal relationships espoused by the belief theories) are not easily changed by contradictory day-to-day evidence. This suggests that these beliefs, being especially resistant to change, might serve some psychological needs of their own that they might result from needs to bolster and justify prejudice (affect) and discrimination which, in turn, might serve a multitude of economic, political, personality, and/or social status needs (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Allport, 1954) .
The question of which comes fi rst, the affect (prejudice) or the cognitive support (stereotype, or beliefs about beliefs) is a debatable issue, but might best be resolved by admitting to mutual causal relationships between the variables, especially, of course, if those mutual relationships can be demonstrated. It is curious that this type of controversy develops in modern psychology. In the abstract, most of us agree that most psychological processes conceptualized at the level of cognition and affect seldom occur in unidirectional causal relationships, but involve instead complex feedback and interaction. Often, however, when a theorist demonstrates one side of that loop as his area of special interest, he is engaged in debate by others who choose to emphasize the opposite part of the loop; this eitheror-type debate tends to becloud the issues. To return to the specifi c issue, it may, indeed, be quite appropriate to suggest that the anticipation of belief differences causes prejudice, but if we were to stop there, other important and complicating relationships might well be missed. Data presented in this paper indicate that prejudice causes the anticipation of belief differences. That opposite causal relationship does not negate the belief view; we should visualize a relationship of mutual infl uence between antipathy and expectancies about beliefs.
A THEORETICAL RESOLUTION
The theoretical position of this paper then, is as follows: While research supporting the belief theory indicates that prejudice is based on or caused by the anticipation of belief differences, certain real-life observations and other psychological evidence suggest that some other complicating factors infl uence the dynamics of prejudice. The research reviewed above, which has often been cited as providing apparent evidence for the belief theory (Insko, 1967; Kirscht & Dillehay, 1967) , fails to withstand this argument both on the logical grounds explicated above and because certain critical complicating factors, present in real life, have been absent from those research efforts.
It could be argued that the intent of all psychological laboratory research is to isolate certain critical variables from the complications of real life, and that our conclusions are always tempered by an implied "all other things being equal." This is a justifi able approach, but it requires that when we interpret the signifi cance of our fi ndings for the real world, we temper them with the qualifi cations that they have come from relatively artifi cial and contrived situations. This tempering has not been applied to the belief theory research. The belief theory researchers, having investigated prejudice from few limited paradigms, have stacked the experimental deck to prove that belief differences account for it all. The two experiments presented in this paper are an attempt to demonstrate how one might "unstack" such experiments by using belief information which is very relevant to race, by presenting that information in a more real-life-like context, and by using dependent measures which provide abroad range of prejudice indexes. Even when all this is done, of course, it is still illogical to try to assess the relative infl uence of race and belief.
The hypothesis underlying the research of this paper is simply that it is not possible to consider realistic and racially relevant belief manipulations to be independent of the race manipulations; these two types of variables are, when realistically presented, interactive. And that interaction is extremely (perhaps hopelessly) complex. As information is received, the degree it will be differentially interpreted by different listeners will depend on the manner of information presentation (is interpretation possible, or is a checklist of attitudes provided), the specifi c nature of the information (does the listener have race-relevant preconceptions concerning this specifi c topic), the salience of the race differences (did the term "Negro" appear on a form, or has one seen the individual or heard his voice), and the prejudice level of the listener. The research discussed in this paper was designed to illustrate part of this complexity-to demonstrate that a communicator's race and communicated information do interact, or that the manipulation of race infl uences the interpretation of information.
Consider again the research which has been applied to the question of race versus belief. The two paradigms which have I tended to consistently support the belief theory (the simple statements of Rokeach et al., 1960 , and the attitude checklist technique originated by Byrne & Wong, 1962) both used belief presentation techniques which permitted the subjects very limited latitude for interpretation. Had that information been presented in a more life-like or equivocal form, it would have been I more possible for the subjects' race prejudices to have infl uenced their understanding, of interpretation of the information, with the result that relatively greater proportions of the variance in those studies would have been contributed by race variables. The possibility that the results might be quite different when information presentation techniques are different, perhaps more lifelike, will become more evident with the presentation of the data of this paper.
RESEARCH SUPPORTING A MORE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP
These data were derived from two separate research efforts, the fi rst conducted with middle-class women in Rochester, New York, the second with university students in Lincoln, Nebraska. Although the fi rst study was a complex study concerning a variety of questions pertaining to prejudice, only that portion of its data relevant to the present issue and to the Lincoln study is discussed.
The hypothesis of the fi rst study was that if an individual were overheard talking about himself, and about his beliefs, the degree to which subjects would rate their beliefs as similar to the speaker's would depend on both the apparent race and class of the speaker. Since the results of that research infl uenced the development of the second study, a preview of the results of the fi rst is necessary here. While lower-class status of the communicator resulted in the subjects' seeing their views as being less similar to the communicator across most belief issues discussed, race had a much more variable effect, obviously interacting with the specifi c belief issue, sometimes infl uencing the listener toward greater agreement with the black speaker (compared to the white communicator), but sometimes infl uencing in the opposite direction. This fi nding, that agreement with the stimulus individual appears to result from an interaction of the specific belief issue with race, is similar to other fi ndings (Dienstbier, 1970 ) that race interacts with the specifi c social-distance-type item used to assess prejudice. Thus, either positive or negative bias might be evidenced by the same subject toward a black stimulus individual, depending on the specifi c belief issue (as indicated by the present research) or the specifi c prejudice measure.
The specifi c fi nding from the fi rst study which inspired the second concerned the communicator's discussion of integration. His very conservative statements ("I think it's too early for black people and white people to live together") found greater subject agreement by the white subjects of that study if the speaker were perceived as black than if white. The second study was an attempt to determine whether more radical racial information (a black-power speech) would be more consistently threatening from a black than a white communicator. In the second study, as in the fi rst, the dependent measures indicated how similar the listener perceived his own attitudes to those expressed by the racially labeled communicator.
STUDY I

Method
Subjects. The 74 women who participated in this experiment were drawn from a women's club for newcomers to the Rochester area. Subjects were all white and generally from middleclass backgrounds; most were between 25 and 40 years old. The subjects volunteered to participate in this research in return for the experience gained from such participation and for a lecture on sex from Vincent Nowlis. Subjects were randomly assigned to the four conditions of the experiment.
Design and procedure. After being randomly assigned to one of four areas in a 360-seat auditorium, instructions were read to all four experimental groups simultaneously. Those instructions informed the subjects that they were to participate in two studies, one of the effect of "TV blurriness" on mood, the other concerning the evaluation of an (audio only) interview. The subjects were told that the person who was the subject of the silent video sequence was the same person whom they would subsequently hear interviewed. It was explained that it would be helpful to know what the interviewee looked like in order to be able to visualize him during the interview; since the video-blurriness study was to have been done anyway, the subjects were told that it was time-saving for the experimenter and the subjects to have the interviewee in the video sequence.
The subjects then fi lled out a Mood Adjective Check List (MACL: Nowlis, 1965) , saw the one-minute video sequence which differed for each of the four groups, and fi lled out a second MACL. Curtains erected in the auditorium allowed subjects to see only the one TV set in front of their group. In all four video sequences the same actor was presented, dressed, and made up to appear as either white or Negro, and of apparent middle-class or lower-class status. The race change involved grease paint and a neatly trimmed Afro wig. The social class change involved only a clothing change from suit to work clothes. A between-groups factorial design of Race × Class Status was thus effected, with each subject group seeing only one of the four TV sequences. Since the purpose of the video was only to effect the race and class manipulation, all four sequences were as identical in action as possible, consisting of a dull sequence of the man entering a room and sitting down.
Since all the subjects in each group had been led to believe that they saw the same stimulus individual as had the other subject groups (the TV sequences supposedly differing only in blurriness), it was possible to present the same (audio only) tape-recorded interview of the stimulus individual to all subjects simultaneously. The interview was presented as being a training interview of a male stimulus individual by a female counseling student.
Pretests of the TV sequences on another population indicated that the actor was adequately convincing as either a black or white man. (A great deal of selecting and pretesting was required to fi nd a man whose voice was believable as black or white.) A postexperimental check on the suspiciousness of the subjects on that aspect of experimental credibility was also conducted.
The interview lasted about 15 minutes, with topics discussed by the interviewee ranging from interpersonal relationships with family and friends to more abstract questions concerning political participation, crime, rioting, and integration. Generally, the interviewee was rather dull and negative. Following the interview, all subjects answered scaled items which pertained to the felt similarity of their beliefs to those expressed by the stimulus individual. The purpose of the similarity items was to measure the subject's felt similarity to the beliefs expressed by the interviewee. Subjects were asked to "Please rate the man who was interviewed, Mr. Jackson, on the similarity of his views to your own." The instructions stressed that "In all cases, you will fi nd it possible to answer the questions from your memory of your impressions of the interview you heard." Sixteen concepts that had been discussed in the interview were rated, including occupational ambition and stability, marriage fi delity, cleanliness, honesty, loyalty to friends, adequacy of encouragement for his children, educational ambition, economic wisdom, political interest, reasonableness of advocated criminal punishment, balance of views on rioting and integration, and the degree to which he drank, was religious, and superstitious. Each concept was rated on a 7-point scale with polar dimensions of "identical" and "opposite." Following the last of these scales, one scale asked the subjects to rate the overall similarity of their beliefs to those of the stimulus individual.
Following written instructions on their use, 13 modifi ed behavioral differential items (Triandis, 1964) representing factors of formal social acceptance, friendship acceptance, social distance, and subordination were included. These were presented in the same 7-point form previously described, with polar concepts of "would" and "would not."
The behavioral differential scales were followed by a 7-item updated Ethnocentrism Scale (Adorno et al., 1950) taken from the "Other Minorities and Patriotism" section of the "suggested fi nal form" of the Ethnocentrism Scale. Items were updated by changing references from "zoot-suiters" to "hippies," from the League of Nations to the United Nations, and from the "secret of the atomic bomb" to "military rock-ets" Sections pertaining to ethnic minorities were not included, since it was expected that some Jewish subjects would be participating and since not all subjects were exposed to Negroes in the experiment, possibly resulting in differential sensitization to Negro items.
The last page of the questionnaire booklet concerned suspiciousness; subjects were asked questions ranging from general ones of whether they noticed "anything special or unusual about the TV presentation" or about the interview, to specifi c items concerning the probable occupation of the interviewee and his race. Finally, subjects were asked to comment on the overall goals of the experiment as they saw them; a series of specifi c questions designed to detect suspiciousness of all critical aspects of the experiment followed.
With the completion of the questionnaires by the subjects, the experiment was over. The major aims of the research and the necessity for the race and status deceptions were then explained to the subjects in an extended debriefi ng.
Results
Of the 74 subjects who fi nished the experiment, 18 were eliminated for suspiciousness of the race manipulation, gross misidentifi cation of the race of the stimulus individual, or the failure to follow instructions.
Although subject attrition did not vary between conditions, the loss of subjects resulted in unequal numbers of subjects in the four conditions of the experiment and the analyses of variance which were performed on the scale data were of the unweighted means type (Meyers, 1966) . This design allowed the use of the data of all the subjects who were not eliminated for the reasons stated above.
Generally, as indicated in Table 1 , the hypotheses concerning the effect of perceived class status/on the effect of the belief material were confi rmed for 13 of the 16 belief issues (in direction of effect, but not statistically significant), beliefs being rated more similar if attributed to the middle-class stimulus person. Statistical signifi cance (p < .05) was found on four of those issues concerning ambition, occupational stability, loyalty to friends, and aspirations for children. A composite similarity score based on all 16 issues also showed a similar signifi cant class effect. All three scales which indicated a reverse from hypothesis were nonsignifi cant.
Racial infl uences on belief similarity ratings were not as consistent. In fact, 11 of the 16 independent belief-topic items indicated a trend opposite to the hypothesis, with greater rated similarity in the communicator-Negro than in the communicator-white conditions. The F ratio of less than 1.0 for the composite (of all the belief-topic items) similarity score also refl ected the inconsistent race effect between the similarity scales. Of the three items which indicated statistical signifi cance based on the race variable, subjects agreed more with the white stimulus individual's views concerning aspirations for his children, but more with the black individual's views on integration and religion. Since the integration issue is of major importance for its implications for the second study of this paper, it will be emphasized here.
The portion of the interview pertaining to the stimulus person's views of prejudice was as follows :
Stimulus individual: I think sometimes it's too early for whites and blacks to live together. I don't know-sometimesmaybe it's too early for that, for integration. Interviewer: But don't you think we should try now, anyway? Stimulus person: Sometimes it seems like we shouldn't, I
don't know.
The mean rating of similarity if the stimulus person was black was 4.0, 2.7 if the person was white (based on a 7-point scale, the higher score indicating greater similarity).
Of the 13 behavioral differential items used to assess social distance of the subject toward the stimulus person, some were sensitive to race alone (such as "Would exclude from my neighborhood" and "Would accept as a close kin by marriage"), some to class alone (such as "Would treat as an equal," and "Would admire the ideas of") and one to both ("Would accept as a nextdoor neighbor"). Some items were sensitive to neither race nor class.
Finally, within-condition correlations of the Ethnocentrism Scale score for each subject with the subject's composite similarity ratings of the stimulus individual indicated that all such correlations were in the predicted directions, although not quite signifi cant at p < .05. Correlations of-.30,-.43,-.34, and .06 for communicator conditions of Negro lower class, Ne-gro middle class, white lower class, and white middle class, respectively, indicate that while subjects' ethnocentrism tended to reduce felt similarity with the three "minority" communicators, no such effect existed for the white-middle-class communicator.
STUDY II
Method
Subjects. Subjects were 122 white male and female University of Nebraska basic psychology students who volunteered to participate in this study in order to partially fulfi ll an experimental participation requirement.
Design and procedure. Subjects were informed that the procedure was an attitude measurement technique and that they would hear a person discuss various topics on a tape; they were then to respond by indicating "how much you agree or disagree with the speaker, and how much you think you might like him. . . . this is really a survey of your own attitudes on the topics discussed in the tape." Before the tape was played, all subjects were instructed to read part of a professionally printed fl yer which was included in the questionnaire booklet announcing a "symposium on the black in white America." It included one paragraph pertaining to the speaker whom the subjects were about to hear.
The fl yer described preregistration procedures for the symposium, listed the schedule of speakers, and gave a short one paragraph biographical sketch of three of the symposium speakers. The fl yer was the same for the four Race × Status manipulations except that the description of the second participant varied. That critical paragraph was circled by hand, with the accompanying notation "read this section-this speaker will be heard on tape" hand written beside the paragraph. The paragraph, in its four variations, appears below. (Italics are presented here only to accentuate critical differences between paragraphs and were not included in the study manipulations.) That manipulation of communicator's race and class status formed, with sex of subject, a 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design.
For this second study, two different tapes were made, one attributed to a black man named Howard Washington, the second to a white man named Donald Lindzey. Several factors prompted this change from Study I. First, it is extremely diffi cult to make a single sound tape which is equally convincing as that of a white or black speaker. Second, the introduction of vocal differences associated with race would increase the power of the race manipulation. It was felt that these considerations more than balanced the advantage of the clean experimental interpretation allowed by the single-tape manipulation. The procedure necessitated, of course, the running of two separate groups of subjects, each hearing only one of those two critical audiotapes. Attempts to eliminate any selection bias between those two groups included scheduling both sessions at a time in the late afternoon when classes were few, and running the two sessions with the second following immediately after the fi rst. Within each group, subjects of both sexes were randomly assigned to the status conditions. Strenuous attempts were made to equate the two audiotapes on overall quality and emphasis. Specifi cally, although the verbal message was quite controversial, both speakers maintained a calm and paced delivery; this seemed appropriate in view of the fact that the speech was supposedly delivered and recorded at a university symposium.
The opinions on which subject agreement was assessed had all been pretested (the previous semester) in written form for agreement with an independent sample of basic psychology students. It was thus ascertained that a fairly wide rage of statement acceptability was achieved. (Agreement ranged from 4.95 to 2.28, respectively, on a 7-point belief similarity scale from "identical" to "opposite" for items of "Black people do not want to move in with white people" and "Half of every tax dollar from white people should go to support black education, black social services, and black culture.")
The tape recording lasted approximately fi ve minutes, though subjects were left with the impression that it was only the fi rst part of the communicator's speech which was played for them. Unlike Study I, the topics of the speech were restricted to issues of the black minority in a white culture. The range of topics can be seen by the item headings on the fi rst seven items of Table 2 .
After the tape was played, subjects were instructed to turn to the page in the questionnaire booklets which contained the scaled items related to the speech. Instructions for the opinion similarity rating told subjects to "rate the similarity of your own views to his views on the following topics. Base your ratings on what you heard Mr. Washington [or Mr. Lindzey] say on the tape recording." Ratings were made on the same Lykerttype 7-point scales with polar adjectives of "identical" and "opposite" which were used in the pretest for Study II and in Study I. The last of those scales asked subjects for a rating of the general similarity of their values to those of the speaker.
Finally, fi ve social distance and behavioral differential scales similar to some of those used in Study I were employed, with instructions to the subjects to "assume that you had the opportunity to interact with him in the manner suggested by the question" in responding to those items. Those scales form the last fi ve items of Table 2 .
After fi lling out that form, subjects were given a questionnaire meant to assess suspiciousness concerning any deception in the study. The form explained that subjects often "form their Own explanations or hypotheses about what the experimenter is 'really' after," and asked a series of open-ended questions about what suspicions the subject had formed, how certain he was of those suspicions, etc.
Subjects were debriefed concerning the true nature and purpose of the experiment.
Results
Of the 122 subjects who took part in the experiment, two were eliminated for suspiciousness that the tape recordings were not real. Subjects were randomly eliminated from seven of the eight cells of the analysis of variance design to achieve an equal number of subjects per cell, bringing the number of subjects used in the analyses to 88 (there being 11 subjects in the smallest cell). It was felt that the rather large number of subjects still in the design would provide an accurate assessment of the independent variable effects without necessitating the unweighted-means-type analysis used in Study I. Table 2 presents the major results of Study II. Results of communicator variables by subject sex are not included in that table since sex was never a signifi cant interactive variable with race or class. On 12 of the 13 similarity and social distance variables, women subjects tended to be more accepting and to see their beliefs as more similar to the communicator's reversing only on the issue of election to political offi ce. The only statistically signifi cant effects related to sex were for the liking-if-met item (mean liking by women = 4.20 compared to 3.41 for men, F = 4.61, df = 1/80, p < .05) and the accept-as-kin item (mean acceptance by women = 4.30 compared to 3.41 for men, F = 4.51, df = 1/80, p < .05).
Unlike Study I, in which status seemed the most consistently reliable determinant of agreement variance (the communication in Study 1. did not largely concern race-relevant issues), the results of Study II indicated that communicator's race was the single most powerful infl uence on variance for the similarity and social distance scales. That fi nding is indicated strongly by greater agreement with and liking for the white communicator in everyone of the 13 scales used in Study II. This race effect is signifi cant for three of the eight similarity scales (including the general similarity item), and for all fi ve of the social-distance-type measures.
Although the direction of the status differences were consistent with those of Study I, with the middle-class communicator receiving more favorable ratings on 12 of the 13 dependent measure scales, the differences are not statistically signifi cant on any measure.
Finally, there are no statistically signifi cant Race × Class interactions.
DISCUSSION OF THE DATA
Between Study I and Study II, differences existed (a) in the manner in which independent variables of race and status were manipulated, (b) in the content and style of communication delivery, (c) in some of the dependent measure scales, and (d) in the characteristics of the subject populations used. Yet, if the fi ndings of the two studies are broadly considered, it is possible to compare and contrast those fi ndings.
Across both studies, the manipulation of social class status resulted in subjects rating their beliefs as less similar to the lower-class communicator, compared to the middle-class communicator. The topics discussed in the two scripts of the two studies did not, of course, exhaust possible and likely topic areas, and in Study II, while the script was purposefully made race relevant, no such effort was made for relevancy to social class. Therefore, despite the consistency of the class fi ndings, it is expected that one could fi nd topics for such research presentations with which even middleclass subjects would fi nd more agreement with the lower-class communicator.
Within Study I, communicator race and communication topic interacted, so that some issues induced more agreement with the white communicator, while others resulted in the black receiving more agreement. The complexity of the interactions between communicator characteristics and communication content is, therefore, more evident with respect to race than class variables. By restricting the range of the topics used in Study II to a single class of race-relevant issues, it was predicted that the irregular race-topic interaction found in Study I would give way to a consistent unidirectional race effect; this was realized in Study II as the consistent tendency to agree more with (and to like more) the white communicator.
Taken together, the two studies illustrate that expectations which subjects have about class are different from those about race, and that a communication which is relevant to class and/or race, and which is presented in a fashion which permits interpretation latitude, interacts in unique ways with those variables. It is apparent from Study I that these interactions between information content and communicator-characteristic variables are mediated by subject characteristics associated with expectencies, sets, or stereotypes relevant to those communicator characteristics; this relationship was illustrated by the pattern of correlations between subject ethnocentrism and felt similarity toward the communicator. It is also evident, particularly from the results of Study I, that no simple formulation such as suggested by congruity theory (Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955) based only on the I valences of the communicator and the communication could account for the complex ways in which communication and communicator characteristics interact. As illustrated by the behavioral differential and social distance measures of both studies of this paper (as well as by Dienstbier, 1970; Triandis, 1961; Triandis & Davis, 1965) , the degree to which prejudice would be indicated as due to status or race would depend on the dependent measures used to operationalize that construct. It is diffi cult to avoid the suspicion that some circularity has crept into the (reviewed) belief theory literature with respect to the choice of dependent measures. Prejudice has often been operationally defi ned by some dependent measures which have proven to be more sensitive to the belief manipulation than the race manipulation. to suggest, as did Mezei (1971) , that a more race-sensitive measure is unfair since it would be related to and confounded with perceived social pressure is on the one hand admitting the complexity of prejudice, while on the other denying the importance of that complexity since it does not fi t the simpler belief theory.
IMPLICATIONS FOR A REVISED BELIEF THEORY
The belief theory of prejudice suggests that when we perceive an individual to be black, then we make assumptions about his different beliefs-it is these assumptions which account for our negative feelings and our discriminatory actions toward that individual. Not spelled out in this formulation, but seemingly obvious, is the stipulation that the belief areas about which assumptions are made will be relevant to the individual's race, or our stereotype of it. If we see a black person we will not necessarily assume that he is a communist, or an anarchist, or that be believes anecdotal evidence is more valuable than experimental psychology in providing reliable information. Rather, the belief dimensions upon which we might base our discrimination would be relevant to our stereotypes about individuals of that race, and would, therefore, be solidly in the areas about which we anticipate nonconsensus with those individuals. It makes little sense, then, to attempt to demonstrate that racial differences of stimulus individuals have little power to infl uence us when those stimulus individuals are equated on a host of irrelevant beliefs (as has been done so often in the cited belief theory literature). This exercise can only show us that race is not interactive with those belief issues, and that subjects are reluctant to respond negatively toward a racially labeled stimulus person without some justifi cation or that they have no racial prejudice to begin with (or are reluctant to show it), or that they are making unwarranted assumptions about what they should respond to, or that they do not believe the experimenter.
It is apparent that the theoretical and experimental considerations are (or should be) more complex than suggested by the unidirectional conceptualizations of the belief theory researchers. The attempt to account for complex constructs like prejudice on the basis of a single underlying principle cannot succeed. This pattern of theory construction represents a way of conceptualizing human behavior whose roots lie plainly in an oversimplistic view of man.
It may indeed be true (and quite apparently is so) that one's assumption that another individual will not validate one's belief systems will dispose one negatively toward that person. But it is equally true, as evidenced by the present research; that when the belief information is relevant to racial issues, those assumptions of dissimilar beliefs are not always simply and quickly allayed by the presentation of belief information. It appears from this data that assumptions about belief differences are caused by prejudice (read antipathy or negative affect) just as it is also apparent from the belief theory research that prejudice is caused by assumptions about belief differences. In the fi rst case the negative affect may exist for any number of reasons, as indicated by Allport (1954) and discussed in the introduction to this paper. We are not left with a choice between either race (i.e., responses to race not based on belief issues) or belief to account for prejudice. There may indeed be times when a greater reliance on one or the other of those constructs may provide us greater success in the prediction, understanding, and control of certain behaviors, but these are concepts so different in structure that they can neither be logically compared for relative strength nor can they be heuristically seen as hierarchically arranged. They hold, instead, relationships with each other most fruitfully seen as mutually causal or interactive. To lose sight of this mutual causation is to oversimplify the area of prejudice, with the ultimate result that our laboratory studies will have less and less relevance for the real world.
